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Abstract 
During the acquisition life cycle of a product, technology, or service, the Federal Government 
often finds itself dependent upon a single vendor to satisfy requirements. Once the 
Government enters into this long-term business relationship, there may be little leverage to 
control costs and manage performance. This research paper first describes vendor lock and 
its implications. The paper covers recent Department of Defense acquisition guidance and a 
change to the U.S. Federal Statute relative to intellectual property that could impact how a 
System Program Office deals with single-source vendors. The paper then explores specific 
steps that the Government can take now to avoid entering into vendor lock situations, as well 
as additional steps to mitigate the impact of a vendor-locked environment during contract 
performance. Finally, this paper suggests forms of continuous competition that could protect 
programs from vendor lock by maintaining the pressure of competition throughout the system 
life cycle. 
Introduction 
The defense acquisition life cycle contains multiple opportunities to utilize a broad 
base of companies to deliver products and services. Early in the acquisition process, 
requirements development can include many companies, large and small, which can bring 
new technology to the table. As the design evolves, the vendor base is narrowed through a 
down-select process. Dual sources in development are commonplace, and actually 
mandated in acquisition regulations. However, once production begins, the Government 
acquisition experts generally will pick one winner to deliver a product over a lengthy 
operations and sustainment period. This can cause one vendor to become the single 
provider of a product, system, or technology.  
When a vendor wins the production competition award, that vendor becomes the 
single defense contractor delivering those products to the U.S. military customer. If the 
product is utilized by multiple military services, the vendor can become the single provider of 
a family of products or technology through subsequent competitions across a broad 
customer base. This represents billions of dollars in defense business across the three 
services going to a single vendor for very similar systems in the military technology. This 
research paper explores the steps that U.S. military program managers and acquisition 
officials could take to gain leverage in a potential vendor lock situation involving a single 
vendor. This paper does not address or question a vendor’s performance on these 
contracts, but instead centers on the problems that could result from the degree of leverage 
exerted on the Government by a single company. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 133 - 
Vendor Lock  
The term vendor lock describes the situation in which customers depend on a single 
manufacturer or supplier for some product (i.e., a good or service), and cannot shift to 
another vendor without incurring substantial costs or inconvenience. This can grant the 
vendor what amounts to monopoly power and thus creates the opportunity for the vendor to 
earn far greater profits than it could in the absence of such dependence.1 Vendor lock frees 
vendors to establish noncompetitive prices since they have become the “sole source” of a 
given product or service.  
Admittedly, some of the downside of vendor lock may be offset by savings resulting 
from (1) shorter learning curves, (2) development costs absorbed by the vendor because of 
the advantage of controlling a large business base, and (3) investment costs for commercial 
technologies and derivative product lines that can benefit military products. However, those 
savings can be minor compared to the typical cost growth associated with single-source 
acquisition programs. A GAO report revealed that the average major defense weapons 
system experienced a 38% cost growth from original estimates and a 27-month schedule 
overrun.2  
Vendor lock often has two main drivers: lack of Government ownership of assets 
(technical data and intellectual property), and lack of continuous competition during 
production. A recent survey of 340 defense leaders identified problems associated with a 
broken acquisition process; this survey showed 39% of the respondents identified lack of 
Government ownership of key assets, and 30% of respondents identified vendor lock-in or 
sole source as problems that drive acquisition problems.3  
Proprietary intellectual property (IP) rights restrictions may result from technical data 
and standards controlled by the vendor. Recently, the Government made significant 
changes to U.S. Federal Statute relative to IP rights: The Government may now challenge 
restrictions placed on the IP by the vendor.4 Previously, vendors simply declared ownership, 
forcing the Government to disprove the allegations. This change in the law may be vital to 
breaking or mitigating vendor lock in the future.5 The Air Force released their sixth edition of 
the Technical Data and Computer Software Rights Handbook for Acquisition Professionals, 
March 2014, where they emphasized the value of owning technical data rights:  
Specifically, if Program Office personnel do not acquire sufficient rights in 
technical data and computer software prior to award, they may relinquish the 
opportunity to enhance competition and preserve core logistics capabilities as 
required by 10 U.S.C. §§ 2464 and 2466. If the Government relinquishes that 
                                            
 
 
1 Office of the Secretary of Defense Open Systems Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program Managers, 
Version 1.1. May 2013. Appendix 10, Breaking Vendor Lock. Washington, DC; p. 167. 
2 GAO.  March 2012, Report GAO 12-400SP, Defense Acquisitions Assessment of Selected Weapon Programs, 
Washington, DC; p. 8. 
3 Government Business Council and Booz Allen Hamilton, Bridging the Disconnect, Insight Report, March 2014, 
Government Executive Media Group, Washington, DC, p. 1. 
4 Taft News and Events; DoD Issues Final Rule on Ownership of Technical Data Rights Where Commercial Item 
is Developed Exclusively at Private Expense, retrieved from http://www.taftlaw.com/news/publications/detail/872-
dod-issues-final-rule-on-ownership-of-technical-data-rights-where-commercial-item-is-developed-exclusively-at-
private-expense. Oct 18, 2011, p. 1. 
5 GAO.  May 2011, Report GAO 11-469, Defense Acquisition: DoD Should Clarify Requirements for Assessing 
and documenting Technical-Data Needs, Washington, DC; p. 1. 
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opportunity prior to award, the Program Office will lock itself into a position 
where the incumbent can force it to pay an exorbitant price years or decades 
hence to be able to use, release or disclose that technical data or computer 
software to individuals outside the Government. Of course, that assumes the 
incumbent is willing to sell the Program Office a license to use, release or 
disclose that technical data or computer software to individuals other than 
Government employees at any price.6 
The value of competition has been incorporated into every major piece of federal 
legislation on acquisition reform and is continually touted in political speeches and public 
engagements. The Department of Defense (DoD) strives to foster competition; however, like 
many Government agencies, the DoD tends to view competition as an activity that occurs 
only during the initial contracting process, rather than as a dynamic tool for achieving 
success over the life of a program. Most military service programs today award development 
and production contracts to a single prime vendor or contractor team. Using this single-
provider approach, the program fails to maintain continuous lifecycle competition—the use 
of competition to motivate contractor performance throughout the life of a program. As a 
result, too many acquisition programs fail to achieve their cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives.  
Avoiding vendor lock or minimizing its effects is consistent with ensuring affordability 
in military systems, as directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) memorandum of September 14, 2010, Better 
Buying Power (BBP). There are several considerations that can drive affordability and 
mitigate or control the impact of vendor lock. This paper addresses several actions that can 
be taken by the military services and their program offices, with specific emphasis on owning 
IP and continually introducing competition into the process.  
Benefits of Competition 
Competition is an extremely strong motivator: The forces of competition act as an 
“invisible hand” to self-regulate contractor performance. Contractors tend to keep each other 
in check, and the Government greatly benefits from, and is protected by, the nature of 
competition. Extensive historic data on military programs has shown that costs consistently 
decline in a competitive environment, while performance and reliability increase. A 2001 
study by the RAND7 Corporation showed that the introduction of a second source during the 
production of the Tomahawk missile led to estimated savings of $630 million, while 
improving the missile’s reliability from approximately 80% to 97%.  
By contrast, a single-provider environment produces smaller performance 
improvements, longer schedules, and higher costs. The same RAND study also revealed 
that the 10 DoD aircraft programs that involved no competition during the production phase 
experienced an average 46% increase in cost over the original budget. Schedule delays and 
cost overruns consume significant resources; for example, a 2011 study by the Center for 
                                            
 
 
6 Acquiring and Enforcing the Government’s Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software Under Department 
of Defense Contracts: A Practical Handbook for Acquisition Professions, March 2014; Office of the Staff Judge 
Advocate, Space and Missile Systems Center; p. 2. 
7 RAND Corporation. 2001. Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter—Opportunities and 
Options. Santa Monica, CA; p. 16. 
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Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)8 found that 32% of the single-award contracts let 
after full and open competition with multiple vendors experienced overruns, at a net cost to 
the Government of $19 billion over the life of the program. Since programs experience fewer 
overruns and delays in a continuous competition environment, the DoD can invest less time 
and money overall in managing its programs. 
Avoiding and breaking vendor lock can be accomplished by creating an environment 
of continuous competition in both development and production. This paper addresses 
several techniques to keep a second or third vendor in the game by offering shared contract 
dollars to pursue alternative technologies and shared contract quantities to maintain a 
production capability at low levels. As a result, the single vendor does not have a lock on the 
business or technology.  
Options for Avoiding Vendor Lock 
The following items should be considered early in the acquisition process, generally 
prior to contract award for production, to offer maximum influence over vendor lock during 
the acquisition life cycle.  
Examine Intellectual Property and Technical Data Rights—IP ownership can 
drive costs up because the owner naturally wants to recoup investment costs through sales 
of its products. Thus, vendors have motivation to declare IP ownership. To overcome this 
issue, the U. S. military must fully leverage all license rights for IP to which it is already 
entitled. Both the development and production contracts can consider three items vital to the 
Government position to avoid vendor lock: technical data procurement, leveraging software 
reuse, and maximum use of open source software. The Government should assess all 
proprietary aspects of the proposed technical and engineering solution and negotiate 
optimum data rights. The Office of the Secretary of Defense Open Systems Architecture 
Contract Guidebook for Program Managers, Version 1.1, Appendix 10, Breaking Vendor 
Lock9 (herein after referred to as the OSD OSA Guidebook) contains several approaches to 
breaking vendor lock. This paper explores several approaches in this section and suggests 
specific activities for the Program Office.  
 Conduct an audit of IP and proprietary IP claims. The program Office should 
challenge restrictions placed on IP by the vendor in its contract and in any 
production change proposals. Vendors develop IP both under Federal 
contracts and at their own expense. The lines can become blurred, especially 
if individual customers (such as the various military buyers) impose unique 
requirements. This is especially true with the emergence of Open Systems 
Software (OSA) and data rights addressed early in the life cycle. Software-
intensive systems share the common problem where vendors use recycled 
code to streamline the software production process. Sometimes vendors 
incorporate open source code in their systems and then claim 
restricted/limited rights over the resulting IP. In these cases, the Government 
                                            
 
 
8 Hofbauer, Joachim et. al. 2011. Cost and Time Overruns for Major Defense Acquisition Programs. Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. Meyers, Dominique. 2002. Acquisition Reform: Inside the 
Silver Bullet—A comparative analysis—JDAM vs. F-22. Acquisition Review Quarterly; p. 1. 
9 Office of the Secretary of Defense Open Systems Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program Managers, 
Version 1.1. May 2013. Appendix 10, Breaking Vendor Lock, Washington, DC; pgs. 167–176.  
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may employ various software code scanning tools to assess limited/restricted 
rights over IP that it did not actually possess. 
The Program Office should communicate with the other military services 
doing business with their prime vendor on similar systems to verify and 
validate which IP the Government has already acquired under 
development and/or production contracts and determine the total extent 
of Federal Government IP.  
The Program Office should consider using software tools, such as the 
Open Source Software Scanner (OSSS),10 to determine if the software 
includes open source code that may provide the Government with 
additional IP rights at no additional cost. Such an activity could be a 
precursor to a broader discussion regarding the source of all software 
code and associated claims of IP license rights, and could support a 
decision to audit the current state of a program’s IP license rights. 
The Program Office should include provisions in the contract that require 
the vendor to provide a detailed approach on use of open source software 
and associated cost efficiencies. The Program Office should use this 
information in analyzing the vendor proposal incorporated into the final 
contract award to determine inconsistencies or redundancy in IP between 
the proposed solutions.  
 Assess what the Government has and may need in the future. The 
Government typically has more IP rights than it realizes because an issue 
may not have been fully explored during the contract negotiation process. 
The Program Office should assess its current IP license rights versus rights it 
might need to ensure the prospect of future competition for the product or 
technology. If they obtain full Government Purpose Rights (GPR) for key 
pieces of IP in the system, it can initiate separate competition among other 
vendors for those subsystems or components. As noted earlier in this report, 
a recent change in the law now makes the contractor responsible for 
defending assertions of limited/restricted data rights for commercial items 
developed completely at private expense.  
The Program Office should seek advice from legal counsel about 
implementation and application of this new legislation.  
The Program Office needs to analyze GPR on past and current product 
contracts, utilizing Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) 
records for other U.S. military contracts with similar GPR provisions 
where available.  
 Plan to transition proprietary interfaces to current industry standard 
interfaces. Proprietary interfaces present an additional issue that may 
contribute to vendor lock. The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has 
                                            
 
 
10 Linux Foundation; open source tools, retrieved from http://www.openlogic.com/products/scanners/; 
http://www.linuxfoundation.org/programs/legal/compliance/tools. San Francisco, CA, p. 1. 
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developed a tool, the Key Open Subsystems Tool (KOSS),11 to evaluate 
which system components may be most susceptible to vendor lock because 
of proprietary interfaces. This tool offers one method for determining the most 
important subsystems/components for which the Program Office should seek 
license rights. The KOSS Tool can identify those important system 
components that may become obsolete or require upgrades more often than 
others. This tool can help a program to evaluate which key system 
components may prove most susceptible to the negative impacts of a vendor-
locked situation. In short, if only one vendor can replace or upgrade those key 
components, that de facto monopolist may be able to exert excess 
negotiating leverage over replacement/upgrade prices. The KOSS tool may 
help the Government to identify any key component interfaces that use 
proprietary standards and should be modified to use open standards, thus 
allowing other qualified vendors to provide replacement components. By 
highlighting these key components, KOSS allows a program to focus its 
efforts on acquiring IP rights only for those highly volatile areas of the system 
and to conserve resources by disregarding IP for other, less important system 
components. 
The Program Office should consider using the KOSS tool or generating a 
similar tool to determine which interfaces on the system may be most 
susceptible to vendor lock in the years to come. The Program Office 
should discuss lessons learned with NAVAIR regarding the benefit and 
utility of the KOSS tool.  
The Program Office could perform an IP Business Case Analysis, as 
prescribed in Better Buying Power initiatives, utilizing discoveries from the 
KOSS tool analysis.  
 Review documentation under Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) items. 
Defense contracts include the Data Accession List (DAL) provision under 
DFARS Clause 52-227-10, which allows the Program Office to determine the 
data it would like to access and at what cost. For example, the Government is 
always entitled to unlimited rights in Form, Fit, and Function data for a given 
system regardless of who funded system development. However, many times 
that information is never requested by the Government. It is vitally important 
that the Program Office consider a review of non-delivered CDRLs and assert 
IP rights in the product or technology as noted in the OSD OA Contract 
Guidebook.12  
The Program Office should use the DAL to require vendors to identify and 
propose cost efficiencies in technical data as a result of technology 
advances.  
                                            
 
 
11 Key Open Subsystems Tool, Naval Air systems Command, Patuxent River, MD; Public Release SPR-09-674, 
5 Aug 2009; retrieved from https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-
US/317012/file/46502/KOSS%20Overview_FINAL_5Aug09.pdf; p. 1.  
12 Office of the Secretary of Defense Open Systems Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program Managers, 
Version 1.1. May 2013. Appendix 10, Breaking Vendor Lock. Washington, DC; p. 171. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 138 - 
The Program Office should look for opportunities to discover redundant 
data delivery or areas where specifications could be revised to allow 
delivery of more common data items. The Program Office should engage 
the vendors and the product supply chain vendors to determine 
opportunities for savings in data delivery.  
Apply Continuous Competition Strategies—The Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) recognizes several competitive acquisition methods. Awards can be made to a single 
winner, or awards can be made to multiple sources, thereby influencing the presence of 
competition for the remainder of the life cycle. Dual sourcing and leader-follower are two 
established acquisition methods used to implement continuous competition throughout the 
life cycle. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Subpart 207.1 
recognizes dual sourcing as a viable approach to acquisition. This method creates 
competitive pressure through having two or more sources deliver systems that meet 
requirements. Dual sourcing has been used primarily by programs with reasonable start-up 
costs that produce large quantities of an item at the least total cost. Under leader-follower 
sourcing, described in FAR subpart 17.4, an otherwise sole-source “leader” contractor 
provides “assistance and know-how” to a “follower” contractor to achieve the benefits of 
multi-sourcing.  
 Consider dual sourcing strategies to introduce continuous competition into 
the acquisition process. Continuous competition strategies and methods can 
be applied from development through production in order to maintain multiple 
sources throughout the acquisition life cycle. These strategies can include 
dual sourcing in production, leader-follower contracts, low-level production 
quantities, and targeted technologies development with a second vendor.  
Competitive Dual Sources. The Government fully funds two contractors to 
execute their designs or solutions to meet a need. The contractors fully 
develop and produce their designs, thus providing the Government with 
two viable solutions. The two sources continuously drive down prices 
while also improving the performance and reliability of their products over 
time. Of the continuous competition strategies, this approach requires the 
greatest upfront investment by the Government, but it also creates the 
most competition and the highest probability of meeting program mission 
needs on schedule.  
 Consider competitive multi-sourcing. Under this approach, programs would 
select more than one contractor to develop, produce, and sustain a program 
throughout its life cycle: a primary source and one or more secondary 
sources that contribute a lower level of design development and work share. 
A second contractor is selected to create a continuous competitive 
environment and to provide a viable back-up should the primary contractor 
fail to meet program objectives. Under this model, the Government awards 
the majority of funding to a prime contractor, and at the same time provides a 
smaller amount of funding to a secondary source. Keeping a second source 
under contract at even a low level (e.g., 5–10% of prime contract costs) 
maintains significant competitive pressure on the prime contractor by greatly 
reducing the barriers of entry into the program (i.e., it lowers the costs of 
switching if the prime does not perform satisfactorily). It also allows the 
second source to refine and mature its technical approach and gain familiarity 
with the program’s operations. The cost of implementing this competitive 
multi-sourcing approach can be relatively small compared to the benefits of 
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competition that it provides. The Program Office can apply this approach in 
several ways to maintain continuous competition in all stages of the 
acquisition lifecycle:  
Percentage-Based Distributions. Under this strategy, a set percentage of 
funding is allocated to each source. For example, Vendor A submits the 
best offer and receives the majority of funding (e.g., 90%) as the primary 
source. Vendor B submits the second-best offer and receives a smaller 
percentage of funding (e.g., 10%) to partially develop its design or to work 
on a particular subset of the contract requirements. This strategy keeps a 
second viable source in play during the prototyping, development, 
production, and sustainment phases, which will provide competitive 
pressure to motivate the primary contractor.  
Full Development With Scaled Production. Under this strategy, two or 
more contractors are fully funded to develop prototype products. After the 
two prototypes have been delivered, the Government selects one 
contractor for full-scale production and awards a contract for limited 
production to the second source. This strategy can work best for products 
to minimize risk during the design phase of the program. 
Next Increment Prototype Model. Under this strategy, the Program Office 
uses a primary source to maintain engineering capability for the current 
production unit. A lesser amount of funding is provided to a secondary 
source to build a prototype for the next program increment. In addition to 
getting a head start on the next spiral of development, this mechanism 
allows the Program Office to introduce a second capable source and 
position it to compete with the prime for the next program increment.  
Partial Contractor-Funded Development Model. Under this strategy, the 
Program Office caps the amount of development funding to a second 
contractor (e.g., 30% of proposed costs). The contractor has the option to 
fully fund the development of the proposed design. This gives the 
contractor the potential to recapture these development costs during the 
production phase if the Government selects the second contractor’s 
design for production. 
Explore Shared Military and Commercial Technology—The Government should 
not rely on the vendors claim that technology only has a military application; an independent 
Government analysis should be conducted to determine potential areas of both military and 
private investment relative to product technology. The DCMA and Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) both have information on the vendor’s total federal contract business base 
for product technology, including any independent research and development (IR&D) 
applied to the corporation’s commercial work.  
 Examine investments in technology across vendor product lines. Many 
programs are aligned with vertical integration points to ensure the system 
operates efficiently. However, looking at horizontal system-of-system 
integration points across multiple production lines for products may reveal 
cost savings and areas that could justify revision to the specifications to take 
advantage of common technology advances. 
The Program Office should continually pursue vendors to identify specific 
opportunities for cost sharing, such as software reuse and horizontal 
interfaces. 
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The Program Office should request an independent review by DCMA and 
DCAA, separate from the normal product proposal audit, to identify areas 
of cost efficiency based on an understanding of vendor investments in 
technology across product lines.  
Plan for Alternative Production Quantities—Many times economic ordering 
quantity assumptions will lead the Government to purchase more capabilities than needed. 
The cost of a product increases as production slows, based on assumed fixed cost 
allocations across a smaller business base. There may be a tendency to buy more 
production units than needed in order to keep the unit cost down and production lines open. 
But in the larger picture, this leads to higher overall costs. The more compelling argument 
for higher production pace is to reduce risk of lost expertise and industrial base capability. 
This additional risk is usually assumed but never quantified through vendor proposals and 
the independently verified.  
 Review production quantity assumptions. To avoid unverified assumptions 
and unjustified risk, pricing for quantity variables should be included in the 
solicitation for production, and then evaluated for the risks and benefits of 
various buying scenarios using real pricing from the vendor.  
The Program Office should structure the contract line items to 
accommodate multiple production paces in order to verify the costs and 
impact of slower or accelerated production rates.  
The Program Office should request that DCAA scrutinize the price 
differences of various quantity options to allow the Program Office to 
weigh the costs against risk reduction.  
The Program Office should conduct an independent study about 
assumptions around production rates and impact to the industrial base for 
their military systems or technologies. The Program Office may use 
assumption analysis in the AT&L PARCA Report, Performance of the 
Defense Acquisition System 2013 Annual Report,13 which addresses the 
impact of framing assumptions on baseline costs. 
The Program Office should look across multiple production lines for other 
military service requirements for examples of production paces and 
economic ordering quantity strategies. 
Evaluate Test and Evaluation Strategies—Testing and design problems can be 
major cost drivers for any large system. The DoD has canceled entire programs for cost 
overruns under the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment after investing billions of dollars. According 
to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 50 of 74 breaches involved engineering 
design issues discovered after production had begun.14 By law, AT&L Office of Performance 
Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) must perform a statutory root-cause 
analysis for all “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breaches as well as discretionary root-cause 
                                            
 
 
13 Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2013 Annual Report, Washington, DC: Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 201; p. 10. 
14 GAO. 2011. Trends in Nunn-McCurdy cost breaches for major defense acquisition programs (Report No. GAO 
11-295R). Washington, DC; p. 1. 
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analyses requested by the Secretary of Defense (see 10 U.S.C., Section 2438).15 These 
breaches focus on work content changes (changes to technical requirements, testing, and 
system interoperability requirements). The Navy has shown a distinct advantage in the 
aircraft area to control costs, since they control the work content changes. The Navy has 
also adopted a process improvement approach to the production test for the Navy Multiband 
Terminal (NMT) going through test in 2012. The Program Office may want to consider the 
lessons learned from NMT as they execute the production contract.  
 Adopt a broad test strategy. There are several opportunities to adopt a better 
test and evaluation strategy and apply these strategies early in the 
development phase and continue the strategy throughout the production 
process: 
Family of Products—Interoperability standards need to be established for 
broad system or total technology acquisitions. Require the vendor to 
develop alternative material solutions, and then have another vendor 
validate the standards.  
Cloud and Virtualization—Run applications as a service, moving away 
from the vendor and a stovepipe environment for multiple products for 
different systems. Adopting common systems early in the process will 
help manage upgrades after production has started, and minimize 
schedule impact. 
Early Involvement by Test and Evaluation (T&E) Experts—Create an 
evaluation framework early in the system development, prove the design 
and sustainment concepts early through demonstration and test, apply 
challenge-based acquisition methods. The DoT&E Annual Report of 2013 
recommends early involvement.  
Develop a Common Test Environment—so that the system can be proven 
to be end-user suitable as well as supportable. Cyber upgrades and 
software fixes need to be easily accommodated using a common test 
environment strategy.  
IP Rights Need To Be Established for Test Data—not just for unlimited 
rights in technical production data and computer software. IP rights 
should extend to the development and test environment where vendors 
may lay the groundwork for system changes.  
Minimizing the Effects of Vendor Lock 
Several actions can be taken during the production phase of the acquisition life cycle 
in order to minimize the effect of vendor lock for the remainder of the production delivery.  
Adopt a Common Architecture Approach—While products may have been under 
development for some time, the Program Office can still take certain actions to minimize the 
impact of vendor-lock. These activities include the following: 
                                            
 
 
15 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2013. Performance of the 
Defense Acquisition System, 2013 Annual Report, Washington, DC; p. 36.  
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 Develop a common architecture across a product line. If the Program Office 
already finds itself tied to a single vendor for the product or technology within 
a system or program, it could foster development of a common architecture 
via a comprehensive migration approach. This strategy for migration to a 
common architecture may include a single military service range of systems 
or could constitute a Joint approach with other military counterparts that have 
contracted with the vendor to develop similar systems.  
The Program Office should develop a mitigation strategy that addresses 
how an effort may be structured to support commonality across a line of 
products with several different customers, and consider the OSD OA 
Contract Guidebook16 as part of this migration strategy, 
The Program Office should focus on legacy programs, paying particular 
attention to “back-fit” and “forward fit” of systems.17 
 Negotiate priced line items for technical data and open systems architecture 
under the existing contract under a sole source Justification and Authorization 
(J&A). The Air Force’s Technical Data and Computer Software Rights 
Handbook recommends that the Program office anticipate buying technical 
data and rights after the contract is awarded under a sole source 
environment.18 The Program Office should take steps during the contract 
period of performance to identify, reverse engineer, or acquire technical data 
or computer software that could support open systems architecture under the 
J&A.  
The Program Office should plan to negotiate additional technical data and 
computer software when markings can be removed to allow full use under 
the current production contract and any planned follow-on competitions.  
The Program Office should take advantage of Open Business Model (i.e., 
Open System Architecture) practices to minimize future sole source 
situations. 
Explore Commonality Across Product Lines—The military services can often 
drive costs because they demand unique Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), which 
drives non-standardization. Collaboration across the other military services to develop 
common performance requirements may result in a decrease in the cost of the product or 
technology.  
 Review specifications for commonality. The Program Office should develop a 
plan for encouraging more standardization of components and parts across 
the production line, utilizing DCMA as a focal point for data analysis. The plan 
should include better visibility into prime vendor usage of single-source 
                                            
 
 
16 Office of the Secretary of Defense Open Systems Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program Managers, 
Version 1.1. May 2013. Appendix 10, Breaking Vendor Lock. Washington, DC; p. 173. 
17 Office of the Secretary of Defense Open Systems Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program Managers, 
Version 1.1. May 2013. Appendix 10, Breaking Vendor Lock. Washington, DC; p. 173.  
18 Acquiring and Enforcing the Government’s Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software Under 
Department of Defense Contracts: A Practical Handbook for Acquisition Professions, March 2014; Office of the 
Staff Judge Advocate, Space and Missile Systems Center; p. 48. 
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suppliers and an ability to modify requirements so that standard commercial 
parts can be substituted for single-source parts.  
The Program Office should consider reaching out to its military service 
counterparts to determine if any duplication of efforts might be occurring 
across the other Services’ like systems because of non-standard 
requirements. 
The Program Office should pursue reduced operating and maintenance 
(O&M) costs by asking the prime vendor to provide supplier efficiency 
proposals.  
 Look for production efficiencies. DCMA is a resource that could be utilized 
more by the services to provide information about production and quality. 
DCMA, through their Engineering and Analysis Division, could provide broad 
technology analysis across production lines of a single vendor under vendor 
lock. DCMA performs the role of administration of the contract deliveries, 
payment, quality, safety, and some technical support. The services usually 
retain administration of major engineering and technical changes during post-
award, such as managing engineering change proposals (ECP) and systems 
engineering functions. Therefore, DCMA may have limited insight into 
requirements changes that impact the production floor.  
The Program Office should engage with DCMA to conduct a 
comprehensive review of production and quality data for commonality in 
supplier parts and production processes. This review could include 
analysis of production systems approvals, investment in plant equipment 
and production technology, and planned expansion or collapse of 
production capabilities that could cause price increases if the vendor goes 
unchallenged.  
The Program Office should engage DCAA as a technical auditing arm. 
The FAR requires an audit by DCAA for major production acquisitions. 
DCAA can provide more than rate verification for direct and indirect costs, 
to include an analysis of systems engineering and technical assumptions. 
DCAA audits can be invaluable to verify or validate a vendor’s VECP or 
ECP proposal, and compliment the Program Office engineering staff. 
Manage Subcontractor, Supplier, and Make-or-Buy Decisions—The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires Government approval of subcontracting actions. On 
many large systems contracts this approval is pro forma, signifying that the Government has 
faith that the vendor has selected the right teaming partners and supply chain vendors to 
bring supplies and services to the program cost effectively. Often the subcontracts are 
negotiated as sole-source vehicles because of an established relationship between the 
prime vendor and a particular subcontractor. However, after down-select from competitive 
development phase, the losing vendor may have a suite of subcontractors and suppliers 
with capability that might be available to the Program Office because they are not under 
contract to winning vendor. This creates a pool of viable options at the subcontractor level 
for production. 
If the vendor’s normal business practice is to perform most of its work in house, 
subcontracting may not a large factor in production. The Program Office may be rewarding 
the vendor as the prime (with higher profit) for “making” more of the lower tier parts (vs. 
competitively “buying” them), a disincentive to efficiency. The Program Office might benefit 
from further use of subcontractors under competitive environments.  
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 Determine opportunities for competitive subsystems or components. 
Minimizing the impact of vendor lock can include identifying the components 
of the system that offer the greatest potential for cost reduction if they were 
competed instead of sole source subcontractor procurement.  
The Program Office should have the prime vendor to provide a full market 
research data in accordance witg FAR Part 10 to leverages maximum 
access to other suppliers. 
The Program Office could consider small business subcontracting and 
leveraging Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) to introduce new 
players in the program. 
The Program Office should utilize contract clauses such as the Value 
Engineering Change Proposal (VECP) or award fee incentive provisions 
to encourage the contractor to submit proposals for efficiencies with their 
suppliers.  
 Scrutinize component make-or-buy decisions by the prime vendor. The 
Program Office could pursue subcontractor sources if the prime vendor’s 
costs to produce an item appear too high. For example, the other competing 
development vendor may have a key component that had been 
subcontracted, which indicates the existence of a supplier base for this 
component.  
The Program Office should require the prime vendor to develop an 
analysis of alternatives (AoA) with a minimum of three alternatives: make, 
buy, or hybrid buy with multiple suppliers.  
The Program Office should require the prime vendor to develop a basis of 
estimate (BOE) that supports the technical approach to make or buy. The 
prime vendor should substantiate the BOE with costs and plans for 
efficiencies in production.  
 Analyze requirements that drive variations in supplier products and price. The 
Program Office may identify components or subsystems across the 
production contract that could be redesigned to accept commercial variants. 
This would serve as a mechanism for including alternative sources of supply 
for system upgrades at a later date. This would create incentives for the 
prime vendor to perform effectively, knowing that the customers themselves 
are continually reviewing requirements for cost drivers. 
The Program Office should engage with supply chain vendors to identify 
efficiencies in production lines. Small businesses have complained that 
large prime vendors drive supplier prices up because of unique 
specifications from a broad customer base. This set of suppliers offer a 
promising source of price efficiencies.  
The Program Office should engage DCMA to explore supply chain 
efficiencies. DCMA has a strong relationship with the suppliers and 
service providers within the Prime Vendor’s team. DCMA is in a position 
to approve delivery and quality inspection of supplier parts. Therefore, 
they have data on defects, supply chain problems that can lead to cost 
increases in production, or potential efficiencies.  
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Establish a Collaboration Forum—No one military service or private organization 
has a monopoly on good ideas. A vendor lock situation creates a unique opportunity for 
multiple military customers to recognize the implications and take steps to avoid the 
potential drawbacks associated with having a sole-source supplier for their program or 
technology. Establishing a collaboration forum could aid in identifying ways to improve 
vendor performance and lower costs in a vendor-locked environment. The military services 
have convened similar joint forums for other technologies in the past; for example, during 
the 1990s the Air Force and Navy formed a Joint Missile Board to reduce costs for 
production and operations of the Navy’s Joint Air-to-Air Missile systems. According to statute 
and the DoD’s acquisition policy, major defense acquisition programs are required to 
conduct annual configuration steering boards to review proposed changes to the program’s 
requirements or significant technical configuration changes that may impact cost and 
schedule performance.19 According to a recent GAO report,20 37 current major weapons 
programs have conducted such a review. The Vendor Lock Collaboration Forum could 
compliment the mandated configuration steering boards and mitigate or avoid vendor lock.  
The Program Office should consider establishing a forum that includes 
representatives from the other U.S. military customers, the winning 
vendor, and other members of the industry team, academia, and 
Government administrative and quality offices to work through issues in a 
collaborative environment. 
Conclusion 
Avoiding and breaking vendor lock is consistent with ensuring affordability in military 
systems, as directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD[AT&L]) memorandum of September 14, 2010, Better Buying Power (BBP). 
The following suggested actions align with BBP tenets to build affordability into military 
systems acquisitions: 
 Since intellectual property (IP) is a major driver to vendor lock, the Program 
Office should analyze the true ownership and value of IP within the military 
terminal technology. Appendix 10 OSD Open Systems Architecture Contract 
Guidebook provides strategic-level information on breaking and preventing 
vendor lock. Several areas from the Guidebook could be applied to the 
vendor lock acquisition environment. 
 The Program Office should consider continuous competition strategies and 
methods to be applied from development through production in order to 
maintain multiple sources throughout the acquisition life cycle. These 
strategies can include dual sourcing in production, leader-follower contracts, 
low-level production quantities, and targeted technologies development with a 
second vendor.  
 The Program Office should consider looking across the vendor’s complete 
production lines for cost reductions, since economies should be available by 
                                            
 
 
19 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 814 (2008). 
20 GAO. March 2014, Report GAO 14-340SP, Defense Acquisitions—Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, Washington, DC; p. 45. 
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having one vendor producing all military technology. This review should an 
independent analysis to identify areas of redundancy and product variations 
that drive costs. This review should explore opportunities for shared 
technology for both military and commercial variants 
 The Program Office should collaborate closely with DCMA to review 
production testing and quality control specifications to mitigate cost drivers in 
redesign and product changes. The Program Office should draw on data 
produced by the DoD Office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause 
Analyses (PARCA)—the central office for performance assessment, root 
cause analysis, and earned value management of major Defense 
authorizations. PARCA possesses data that can support further review of 
cost drivers and programmatic issues, especially in design and testing.  
 The Program Office should look for efficiencies in the supply chain and 
supplier costs. Many times, suppliers know where variations in production 
runs that could be standardized with minor adjustments to requirements 
without sacrificing mission. 
 The Program Office should leverage the ability to renegotiate prices in post-
award in order to continually examine prices and price creep under a firm-
fixed-price contact. The Program Office should consider the following areas: 
IR&D cost sharing, IP ownership, technical data reuse, component and 
supplier parts competitions, quantity discounts, or commonality of supplier 
parts. Utilize contract clauses, such as Value Engineering Change Proposals 
(VECP), award fee incentive provisions and post-award audit results to 
potentially renegotiate prices.  
 The Program Office should consider enhancing collaboration across the 
Military Services by establishment of a Joint Cross-Service Collaboration 
Forum to focus on ways to mitigate and avoid vendor lock.  
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